\u3cem\u3eNCAA v. Tarkanian\u3c/em\u3e: The State Action Doctrine Faces a Half-Court Press by Riguera, Jose R.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 44 Number 1 Article 6 
9-1-1989 
NCAA v. Tarkanian: The State Action Doctrine Faces a Half-Court 
Press 
Jose R. Riguera 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
 Part of the Fourteenth Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jose R. Riguera, NCAA v. Tarkanian: The State Action Doctrine Faces a Half-Court Press, 44 U. Miami L. 
Rev. 197 (1989) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol44/iss1/6 
This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
CASENOTE
NCAA v. Tarkanian: The State Action Doctrine
Faces a Half-Court Press
I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................... 197
II. PERSPECTIVE ......................................................... 202
A. Early Decisions. Setting the Pendulum in Motion ...................... 203
B. The Supreme Court's 1982 Term: A Trilogy of State Action Cases ........ 206
C. Arlosoroff and Its Progeny.- The Pendulum Swings Back ................ 209
III. NCAA . TARKANIAN: THE NCAA's ISSUANCE OF A "SHOW CAUSE" ORDER
DID NOT CONSTITUTE STATE ACTION ................................... 212
IV . C OM M ENT ............................................................ 216
A. Tarkanian Is Inconsistent with Prior State Action Doctrine ............... 216
1. THE DELEGATION THEORY ........................................ 216
2. THE JOINT ACTION THEORY ....................................... 222
B. Tarkanian Fails to Clarify the Application of the Lugar Framework ....... 225
V . C ONCLUSION ......................................................... 231
I. INTRODUCTION
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, I
by its express language, reaches only the actions of states. Similarly,
42 U.S.C. § 1983, a statute enacted by Congress pursuant to its
authority to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment, 2 is
available to plaintiffs only where the challenged interference with con-
stitutional rights is carried out through the actions of a state.3 This
1. The fourteenth amendment provides, in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
3. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
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textual limitation has led the courts to establish a dichotomy in four-
teenth amendment jurisprudence between "state action," which is
subject to the strictures of the amendment, "and private conduct,
'however discriminatory or wrongful,' against which the Fourteenth
Amendment offers no shield." 4 Despite the appealing simplicity of
the labels "state action" and "private action," determining where to
draw the line between these labels is one of the most difficult issues
that the Supreme Court has faced over the last one hundred years.'
In particular, the state action issue has arisen in recent years
regarding the activities of the National Collegiate Athletic Associa-
tion (NCAA). 6 The issue of the NCAA's status as either a private or
4. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974) (citing Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)). The concept of "state action" had its genesis in the Supreme
Court's decision in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Civil Rights Cases dealt
with constitutional challenges to Sections 1 and 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which
prohibited racial discrimination by private parties in various public accommodations. The
Court declared both of these sections unconstitutional, based upon a determination that the
fourteenth amendment imposed restrictions only against the states. Id. at 11-15. The Court
stated:
[C]ivil rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution against State
aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported
by State authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive
proceedings. The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any such
authority, is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that individual ....
Id. at 17.
5. If there is one point of agreement among commentators in the area of state action, it is
that the field of state action is "a conceptual disaster area." Black, The Supreme Court, 1966
Term-Foreword: "State Action, " Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV.
L. REV. 69, 95 (1967). Professor Black further stated that "eight decades of metaphysical
writhing around the 'state action' doctrine have made it the paragon of unclarity." Id. at 89.
The Supreme Court has stated that it "has never attempted the 'impossible task' of formulating
an infallible test for determining whether the State 'in any of its manifestations' has become
significantly involved in private discriminations." Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378
(1967).
Twenty years later, this characterization continues to be accurate. See. e.g., Friendly, The
Public-Private Penumbra-Fourteen Years Later, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289, 1290 (1982)
(stating that Professor Black's characterization of state action doctrine appears to be "even
more apt today"); Phillips, The Inevitable Incoherence of Modern State Action Doctrine, 28 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 683 (1984) (explaining why contemporary state action doctrine possesses an
incoherent character); Stone, Corporate Vices and Corporate Virtues." Do Public/Private
Distinctions Matter?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1441, 1484 n. 156 (1982) (describing the state action
area as "now, more than ever, a shambles"). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1688-1720 (2d ed. 1988) (explaining the incoherence of modern state
action doctrine).
6. The NCAA is an unincorporated association comprised of approximately 960
members, including virtually every public and private university and four-year college which
conducts a major athletic program in the United States. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454,
457 (1988). The NCAA was originally "founded by a small group of colleges and universities
in 1906 ... primarily to adopt civilized rules of play for intercollegiate sports." Brief for the
Petitioner at 4, Tarkanian (No. 87-1061). The association is now primarily responsible for
generating the rules and sanctions that regulate intercollegiate athletics. Note, Judicial Review
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a state actor has been addressed by virtually every federal court of
appeals.7 The United States Supreme Court addressed this issue for
the first time in NCAA v. Tarkanian.s
In 1977, Jerry Tarkanian became a tenured professor of physical
education at the University of Nevada at Las Vegas (UNLV), while
retaining his position as head basketball coach.9 A branch of the Uni-
versity of Nevada, the UNLV is both an institution funded and oper-
ated by the state of Nevada"° and a member of the NCAA."
On November 28, 1972, the NCAA Committee on Infractions
notified the UNLV's president that it was conducting an investigation
to determine whether allegations that the UNLV had violated certain
NCAA rules were true.' 2 Three years later, and as a result of that
of Disputes Between Athletes and the National Collegiate Athletic Association, 24 STAN. L. REV.
903, 904 (1972).
The constitution and bylaws of the NCAA grant the Association broad authority to act
on any subject of general concern to its members. The NCAA holds annual conventions at
which representatives of member institutions vote on the general policies and rules of the
Association. Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Tarkanian (No. 87-1061). Each member institution
contractually agrees to conduct its athletic programs "in accordance with NCAA 'legislation,'
which includes the NCAA Constitution and Bylaws, official interpretations thereof, executive
regulations, recommended policies and enforcement procedures." Brief for the Respondent at
2, Tarkanian (No. 87-1061) (citations omitted). The NCAA's constitution further provides
that "member institutions shall be obligated to apply and enforce this legislation, and the
enforcement programs of the Association shall be applied to an institution when it fails to
fulfill this obligation." Id. at 3. The enforcement program is administered by a Committee on
Infractions which "supervises an investigative staff, makes factual determinations concerning
alleged rule violations, and is expressly authorized to 'impose appropriate penalties on a
member found to be in violation, or recommend to the Council suspension or termination of
membership.' " Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 457. Specifically, upon discovering a violation, the
NCAA Committee on Infractions or the NCAA Council may require the member to show
cause why:
(i) a penalty or an additional penalty should not be imposed if, in the opinion of
the Committee (or Council), it does not take appropriate disciplinary or
corrective action against athletic department personnel involved in the
infractions case, any other institutional employee if the circumstances warrant,
or representatives of the institution's athletic interests, or
(ii) a recommendation should not be made to the membership that the
institution's membership in the Association be suspended or terminated if, in the
opinion of the Committee (or Council), it does not take appropriate disciplinary
or corrective action against the head coach of the sport involved, any other
institutional employee if the circumstances warrant, or representatives of the
institution's athletic interests.
Id. at 458 n.7 (citation omitted).
7. See infra notes 28-47 & 83-94 and accompanying text.
8. 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988). For a complete discussion of Tarkanian, see infra text
accompanying notes 95-127.
9. Tarkanian v. NCAA, 103 Nev. 331, 335, 741 P.2d 1345, 1349 (1987).
10. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 457.
11. Id. at 456. For a general description of the NCAA, see supra note 6.
12. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 458.
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inquiry, the Committee decided to launch an "Official Inquiry" con-
cerning a series of detailed allegations charging recruitment viola-
tions, many of which implicated Tarkanian, who continued as head
basketball coach.1 3 At the request of the NCAA, the UNLV con-
ducted its own investigation into the allegations. This resulted in a
response denying the allegations and specifically concluding that
Tarkanian was innocent of wrongdoing.'
4
After four days of hearings, the Committee issued findings in its
"Confidential Report No. 123(47)" in which it proposed a series of
sanctions, including a request that the UNLV "show cause why addi-
tional penalties should not be imposed against UNLV if it failed to
discipline Tarkanian by removing him completely from the Univer-
sity's intercollegiate athletic program during the probation period." 5
Shortly after receiving this report, the UNLV's vice president held a
hearing to determine what action the UNLV should take; he con-
cluded that "given the terms of our adherence to the NCAA we can-
not substitute-biased as we must be-our own judgment on the
credibility of witnesses for that of the infractions committee and the
Council." 6 Adhering to the vice president's recommendation, the
president notified Tarkanian that he was to be "completely severed of
any and all relations, formal or informal," with the UNLV's intercol-
legiate athletic program during the NCAA probation period.
1 7
The day before his suspension was to become effective,
Tarkanian filed an action in the Eighth Judicial District Court of the
State of Nevada, praying for declaratory and injunctive relief against
his suspension.'" The suit, which named as defendants the UNLV
and certain of its officers, alleged that Tarkanian was deprived of
property and liberty without due process of law in violation of 42
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 459.
16. Id. The vice president informed the president that the UNLV had three options with
respect to the proposed sanctions:
1. Reject the sanction requiring us to disassociate Coach Tarkanian from the
athletic program and take the risk of still heavier sanctions, e.g., possible extra
years of probation.
2. Recognize the University's delegation to the NCAA of the power to act as
ultimate arbiter of these matters, thus reassigning Mr. Tarkanian from his
present position-though tenured and without adequate notice-even while
believing that the NCAA was wrong.
3. Pull out of the NCAA completely on the grounds that you will not execute
what you hold to be their unjust judgments.
Id.
17. Id.
18. Brief for the Respondent at 18, Tarkanian (No. 87-1061).
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U.S.C. § 1983 and the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution.' 9 The trial court held that Tarkanian had been denied
procedural and substantive due process of law and enjoined the
UNLV from suspending Tarkanian; the UNLV appealed this judg-
ment to the Nevada Supreme Court.2 °
On the UNLV's appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court, the
NCAA filed an amicus curiae brief requesting that Tarkanian's suit be
dismissed on the ground that no actual controversy was presented
between Tarkanian and the UNLV, and "alternatively that the
NCAA 'was an indispensable party' because the injunction had 'the
effect of invalidating NCAA proceedings and preventing their
enforcement.' "2 The Nevada Supreme Court held that an actual
controversy did exist, but it reversed the trial court's judgment on the
grounds "that the NCAA should have been joined" as a necessary
party on the question of suspending Tarkanian.22
The case was remanded to the trial court, where the NCAA was
added as a party defendant. After trial, the court concluded that the
actions of both the NCAA and the UNLV constituted state action
and that the NCAA and the UNLV had deprived Tarkanian of proce-
dural and substantive due process.23 The trial court reaffirmed its ear-
lier injunction barring the UNLV from disciplining Tarkanian and, in
addition, enjoined the NCAA both from enforcing its show cause
order and from taking any other action against the UNLV that had
been recommended in the report.24
On appeal by the NCAA, the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that the NCAA had engaged in state action and, together
with the UNLV, had deprived Tarkanian of liberty and property
interests without due process of law.25 On certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court, held, reversed and remanded: The NCAA did
not engage in state action when it issued a show cause order to the
UNLV asking why additional penalties should not be imposed against
the UNLV if it refused to suspend Coach Tarkanian from the univer-
19. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 459.
20. Id.
21. Brief for the Respondent at 19, Tarkanian (No. 87-1061) (citation omitted).
22. University of Nev. v. Tarkanian, 95 Nev. 389, 396-97, 594 P.2d 1159, 1163-64 (1979).
The court concluded that if the NCAA were not allowed to participate in the litigation, it
would be unable to protect its interests, specifically its claim of a "contractual right to bind the
university to enforce the NCAA's decision by sanctions it deems appropriate." Id. at 396, 594
P.2d at 1164.
23. See Brief for the Respondent at 20, NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988) (No.
87-1061). /
24. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 460.
25. Tarkanian v. NCAA, 103 Nev. 331, 741 P.2d 1345 (1987).
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sity's intercollegiate athletic program during the NCAA probation
period. Although the UNLV's action in suspending Tarkanian was
undeniably state action, the NCAA's action in bringing about the sus-
pension could not fairly be attributed to the state; therefore, the
NCAA could not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the viola-
tion of Tarkanian's civil rights. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454
(1988).
This Note examines the Tarkanian Court's holding that the
NCAA did not engage in state action through its participation in. the
procedures that violated Coach Tarkanian's due process rights. Sec-
tion II examines how lower courts treated the issue of whether the
NCAA was a state or private actor prior to the Tarkanian decision.
Section III presents the Court's holding and reasoning in Tarkanian.
Section IV analyzes the Court's decision and argues that the result is
problematic on two levels: First, the Court's decision that the NCAA
was not a state actor is inconsistent with prior state action decisions;
second, the decision fails to clarify how and when the two-pronged
state action test first announced in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. 26 is to
be applied. Finally, Section V concludes that the Tarkanian Court's
decision fails to hold the NCAA accountable for its actions, a result
which does little to deter the NCAA from continuing to exert pres-
sure on public universities to take constitutionally impermissible
actions. Furthermore, Section V argues that the Court's failure to
clarify the role of the Lugar framework in the analysis of state action
issues adds unnecessary confusion to an already muddled area of con-
stitutional law.
II. PERSPECTIVE
Beginning in the early 1970's, the NCAA has'been under contin-
uing attack from student-athletes challenging the Association's stu-
dent eligibility requirements. 2 Because these plaintiffs have sought to
assert rights protected under the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment, a critical issue has been whether
the NCAA is within the rubric of "state action" when it performs its
regulatory activities as the major overseer of intercollegiate athletics.
This Section will trace the development of the case law addressing this
issue, a development which has proceeded in two distinct segments
and which can most aptly be described by using the metaphor of a
swinging pendulum.
26. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
27. See Note, supra note 6, at 903-04, 929; infra notes 28-47 & 83-94 and accompanying
text.
[Vol. 44:197
1989] NCAA AND STATE ACTION
A. Early Decisions: Setting the Pendulum in Motion
In Associated Students, Inc. v. NCAA, 28 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit became the first federal court of
appeals to consider the issue of the NCAA's constitutional status as a
state actor. The court concluded that the NCAA's enforcement of a
rule pertaining to the eligibility of college athletes and the imposition
of sanctions against a university and the athletes involved was state
action for constitutional and jurisdictional purposes.2 9 In so finding,
the Ninth Circuit did not elaborate on its reasoning beyond quoting
from an earlier district court case, Parish v. NCAA, 3° in which the
issue of state action on the part of the NCAA was raised. The Parish
court had stated: "Therefore, we must and do conclude that there
definitely is State action here, in the constitutional sense, when [the]
NCAA regulates schools and universities at least half of which are
public."'"
Less than one year later, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit affirmed Parish v. NCAA, holding that the NCAA's
activities constituted state action. 32 Like the court in Associated Stu-
dents, the Parish court of appeals relied to a great extent on the lower
court's decision when it affirmed that the NCAA was a state actor.
The court placed equal weight on two basic theories: the "nexus"
concept and the "public function" concept.33
28. 493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1974).
29. Id. at 1254-55. This decision implicitly overruled the reasoning in McDonald v.
NCAA, 370 F. Supp. 625 (C.D. Cal. 1974). See Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1032 n.9
(5th Cir. 1975). In McDonald, the district court judge held that the NCAA's imposition of
penalties upon a university for infractions of its bylaws-resulting in the university declaring
the athletes ineligible to participate in athletics--did not involve state action. 370 F. Supp. at
631. Thus, the athletes had no due process right to a hearing before the NCAA. The court
stated that "[w]hat must appear is that the state must be so inextricably involved in the
'private' action or must be able to so control the 'private' action that this activity necessarily
becomes the functional equivalent of an act of the sovereign." Id. at 630. The court concluded
that this standard was not met because "the NCAA has an existence separate and apart from
the educational system of any state" and because, "[c]onversely, a state's intercollegiate
athletic program does not depend for its recognition, existence or maintenance upon any
sufferance of the NCAA." Id. at 631.
At the time of the McDonald decision, other federal district courts that had considered
this issue had found the NCAA to be a state actor. See Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 367 F. Supp.
926 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Buckton v. NCAA, 366 F. Supp.
1152 (D. Mass. 1973); Parish v. NCAA, 361 F. Supp. 1214 (W.D. La. 1973), aff'd, 506 F.2d
1028 (5th Cir. 1975). But see Samara v. NCAA, No. 104-73-A (E.D. Va. May 1, 1973)
(WESTLAW, Allfeds database) (stating that arguments that the NCAA is a state actor were
"tenuous").
30. 361 F. Supp. 1214 (W.D. La. 1973).
31. Id. (citation omitted), quoted in Associated Students, 493 F.2d at 1254-55.
32. Parish, 506 F.2d at 1034.
33. Id. at 1032-33. In the 1940's, the Supreme Court began to modify the strict stance
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:197
The first basis that the Parish court used to find state action was
the "nexus" theory.34 After referring to the numerous contacts and
the degree of participation of the various states-through their col-
leges and universities-with the NCAA,35 the court indicated that
"state-supported educational institutions and their members and
officers play a substantial, although admittedly not pervasive, role in
the NCAA's program."36 The court then stated that "[s]tate partici-
pation in or support of nominally private activity is a well recognized
basis for a finding of state action"3 7 and concluded that the NCAA
toward state action that it adopted in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), finding
violations of the fourteenth amendment even though the activities complained of were not
formally linked to any action by state officials. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 501 (2d ed. 1983). In the Civil Rights Cases, the Court has developed
a series of theories or tests by which it may be established that a private person's activities
constitute state action. Although there is some variation in the precise categorization of these
tests, three principal approaches may be identified: (1) whether the private actor performs a
traditionally exclusive public function; see, e.g., Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149
(1978) (resolution of private disputes between debtors and creditors is not a traditionally
exclusive state function); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (furnishing
of utility services did not satisfy the public function requirement for a finding of state action
because the public function must be exclusive and not merely traditional); Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501 (1946) (operating a company-town is a public function); (2) whether the state has
been a joint participant in the private action or has otherwise commanded or encouraged the
private action; see, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (a private party
involved in a conspiracy with a state official becomes a state actor and may be found liable in a
Section 1983 action); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (a court order which would enjoin
a sale of property in order to enforce a racially restrictive covenant would violate the
fourteenth amendment); and (3) whether there is a sufficiently close nexus or "symbiotic
relationship" between the state and the private actor; see, e.g., Blum v. Yaretzky, 457 U.S. 991
(1982) (state regulation of private nursing home facilities was not sufficient in itself to
transform private decisions concerning transfer of patients into state action); Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (personnel discharge decisions were not state action although a
private school derived virtually all of its income from government funding and was extensively
regulated by the state); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (extensive
regulation and state licensing of a private utility did not involve sufficient state action to
subject the utility to the constitutional restraints of due process); Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (despite lack of direct government aid, a restaurant which
benefited from its location within a government facility was in a "position of interdependence"
with the state and hence liable for racial discrimination).
For an in-depth discussion of these and other cases that are representative of the various
state action theories, see generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra, at 502-25.
For an excellent historical discussion of the Supreme Court's development of the state action
theories, see Schneider, State Action-Making Sense Out of Chaos-An Historical Approach, 37
U. FLA. L. REV. 737 (1985).
34. Parish, 506 F.2d at 1032.
35. Although the Parish court did not enumerate these contacts in its opinion, the court
pointed to several lower court opinions which had listed these contacts exhaustively. Id. at
1032 n. 10; see also text accompanying note 43.
36. Parish, 506 F.2d at 1032.
37. Id.
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was a state actor.38
The court also relied on the "public function" theory as a basis
for finding the NCAA to be a state actor. 39 After recognizing that
organized college athletics had grown to the point where it was now
beyond the effective reach of any one state, the court concluded that
"[i]n a real sense, . . . the NCAA by taking upon itself the role of
coordinator and overseer of college athletics ... is performing a tradi-
tional governmental function."'
In Howard University v. NCAA, 4 ' the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also concluded that the
NCAA's activities met the necessary state action requirement. Like
the Parish court, the court in Howard found state action under the
"nexus" theory, *noting that the degree of public participation or
entanglement between Howard University and the NCAA was "sub-
stantial and pervasive. ' '42 Specifically, the court found the following
facts to be significant in applying the "nexus" theory: (1) approxi-
mately half of the NCAA's institutional members are state-supported
institutions; (2) these state institutions provide the vast majority of the
NCAA's capital; (3) the principal power of the NCAA lies in its con-
vention, at which state instrumentalities are a dominant force; (4)
state instrumentalities traditionally provide the majority of the mem-
bers of the governing council and the various committees; (5) the
NCAA's regulations and supervision over intercollegiate athletics is
extensive and represents an immeasurably valuable service for its
member institutions; and (6) the NCAA negotiates television con-
tracts, the proceeds of which flow directly to participating schools.
43
The court concluded: "[T]he NCAA and its member public instru-
mentalities are joined in a mutually beneficial relationship, and in fact
may be fairly said to form the type of symbiotic relationship between
public and private entities which triggers constitutional scrutiny. ' ' 44
Thus, with each case that considered the issue, it became more
firmly established that the NCAA's activities in regulating intercolle-
giate athletics constituted state action and were subject to the stric-
38. Id. at 1032-33.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
42. Id. at 220. The court noted that "governmental action may be found even though. the
government's participation was peripheral, or its action 'was only one of several co-operative
forces leading to the constitutional violation.' " Id. at 217 (quoting United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745, 755-56 (1966)).
43. Id. at 219.
44. Id. at 220. For a description of the various theories utilized to extend the concept of
state action to nominally private parties, see supra note 33.
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tures of the fourteenth amendment.4 5 The theories applied in those
cases where state action was found to exist were the "nexus" theory
46
and the "public function" theory.47
B. The Supreme Court's 1982 Term: A Trilogy of State Action
Cases
On the same day in June of 1982, the United States Supreme
Court announced its decision in three cases dealing with the issue of
state action. In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn48 and Blum v. Yaretzky,49 the
Court found no state action on the part of nominally private parties,
thereby severely limiting the viability of the "nexus" theory as a basis
for finding state action. These two decisions had an enormous impact
on the lower courts' treatment of the constitutional status of the
NCAA as either a private or state actor. In the third case, Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co. ,1 the Court held that state action did exist, find-
ing it through what appeared to be a synthesis of the various state
action tests-an analytical framework to be utilized in future cases
that require a state action analysis. Section IV of this Note will con-
sider whether Lugar has in fact become the determinative test for
state action. In order to set the stage for that discussion, the holdings
in Rendell-Baker, Blum, and Lugar will now be discussed briefly.
In Rendell-Baker, the Court rejected the due process claims of
several teachers who had been discharged from a "private" school,
finding that the school's activities did not constitute state action.5'
The Court first rejected an argument that state action should be found
on the basis of the nexus between the school and the state.5 2 Unlike
45. Subsequent cases also followed the reasoning utilized in Howard University v. NCAA,
510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d
352, 364-65 (8th Cir. 1977) (The court adopted the analysis used in Howard and held that the
NCAA is a state actor.); Rivas Tenorio v. Liga Atletica Interuniversitaria, 554 F.2d 492, 494-
96 (1st Cir. 1977) (The court adopted the reasoning used in Howard in finding that a Puerto
Rican intercollegiate athletic association-analogous to. the NCAA-was a state actor even
though the degree of public participation in the Liga Atletica was not as pervasive as in the
NCAA context.); Colorado Seminary v. NCAA, 417 F. Supp. 885, 894 n.4 (D. Colo. 1976),
aff'd, 570 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1978) (There was "sufficient state entanglement" to find the
NCAA to be a state actor.).
46. See Howard, 510 F.2d at 217-19; Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028, 1032 (5th Cir.
1975); Associated Students, Inc. v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251, 1254-55 (9th Cir. 1974); see also
supra note 45.
47. Parish, 506 F.2d at 1032-33.
48. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
49. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
50. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
51. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840-43.
52. Id. at 840-41.
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the court of appeals,53 the Supreme Court did not attribute great sig-
nificance to the fact that the school derived virtually all of its income
from government funding and was extensively regulated by the
state. 4 As to the extensive public funding, the Court held that this
factor alone was not sufficient to make the discharge decisions acts of
the state, analogizing the situation to that of "many private corpora-
tions whose business depends primarily on contracts to build roads,
bridges, dams, ships or submarines for the government" and whose
acts do not become acts of the government by reason of this engage-
ment in public contracts." Addressing the extensive regulation, the
Rendell-Baker Court pointed to its decision in Jackson v. Metropoli-
tan Edison Co. ,56 in which it held that state regulation, even if exten-
sive and detailed, did not convert a utility's actions into state action.
57
The Rendell-Baker Court further noted that the decisions to dis-
charge the teachers were not compelled or even influenced by any
state regulation and that, in contrast to the generally extensive regula-
tion of the school, the regulations had relatively little to do with per-
sonnel matters.5
The Rendell-Baker Court also rejected an argument that the
school was a state actor because it performed a "public function."
The Court stated that the relevant question was not simply whether a
private group was serving a "public function," but rather whether the
function had been " 'traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the
State.' -9 Although the Court recognized that the school's function
in educating maladjusted high school students was undoubtedly a
public function, the Court held that the provision of these services
was "in no way ... the exclusive province of the State" and hence
there was no state action on that basis.6" Finally, the Court rejected
an argument that there was a "symbiotic relationship" between the
school and the state which made the school a state actor.6 1 The Court
distinguished the case at bar from the situation in Burton v. Wilming-
ton Parking Authority,62 a case in which the Court concluded that the
53. See Rendell-Baker'v. Kohn, 641 F.2d 14, 24-25 (1st Cir. 1981) (the fact that the school
was almost completely funded by the government provided significant evidence of state
control).
54. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. at 840-41.
55. Id.
56. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
57. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841 (citing Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350).
58. Id. I
59. Id. at 842 (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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relationship between the state and the private restaurant was such
that the state profited from the restaurant's discriminatory conduct.63
The Rendell-Baker Court held that the school's fiscal relationship
with the state was not different from that of many contractors per-
forming services for the government. 64
In Blum v. Yaretzky,65 the Supreme Court also found that state
action was lacking, and it thus rejected the due process claims of nurs-
ing home patients who had been involuntarily transferred from one
nursing home to another facility that provided a lower level of health
care. 6 6 The Blum Court also considered an argument that the
"nexus" theory was a possible basis for finding state action.67 As in
Rendell-Baker, the Blum Court stated that mere regulation did not by
itself convert private action into that of the state; rather, the com-
plaining party must also show that " 'there is a sufficiently close nexus
between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so
that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State
itself.' "68 The Court went on to note that this nexus requirement
could normally be satisfied only when the state "has exercised coer-
cive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either
overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of
the State" 69 or when the private entity "has exercised powers that are
'traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state.' "70
Applying those principles, the Blum Court held that the nexus
requirement was not satisfied. 71 The state's response to private deci-
sions to discharge or transfer patients to lower levels of care without
adequate notice or hearings did not "render [the state] responsible for
those actions." 72 The Court held that, without a showing that the
state compelled or influenced those private decisions, there could be
no finding of state action.73 The Court next rejected an argument,
similar to that made in Rendell-Baker, that the actions of the nursing
homes became state action by virtue of the extensive regulation and
63. Id. at 723-24, construed in Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842.
64. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 843.
65. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
66. Id. at 1012.
67. Id. at 1004.
68. Id. (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1005 (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357).
71. Id.
72. Id. The Court emphasized that decisions to discharge or transfer particular patients
"ultimately turn on medical judgments made by private parties according to professional
standards that are not established by the State." Id. at 1008.
73. Id.
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subsidization that they received from the state.74 Finally, the Court
held that the nursing homes did not perform a function that had been
traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state and hence con-
cluded that there was no proper basis for finding state action.75
In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. ,76 unlike the other state action
cases decided that day, the Supreme Court concluded that state action
was present. 77 The Court held that the constitutional requirements of
due process apply to garnishment and prejudgment attachment proce-
dures instituted by private creditors whenever state officers act jointly
with those private creditors in securing the property in dispute.7" The
aspect of the Lugar case most relevant to the NCAA cases, however,
was not the decision itself but the manner in which the Court reached
its conclusion. The Lugar Court noted that its cases have "insisted
that the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right be
fairly attributable to the State."' 79 The Court formulated a two-
pronged approach to determine "fair attribution," stating:
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right
or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by
the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible ....
Second, the party charged with the deprivation must be a person
who may fairly be said to be a state actor. This may be because he
is a state official, because he has acted together with or has
obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct
is otherwise chargeable to the State." °
Applying this newly created test to .the case at bar, the Lugar
Court held that both prongs were satisfied. First, the state was
responsible for the procedural scheme of the statute.8' Second, the
sheriff-a state actor-was a joint participant in executing the writ. 2
Hence, the state action requirement of the fourteenth amendment was
satisfied and the private party could be held liable for violating the
plaintiff's due process rights.
C. Arlosoroff and Its Progeny: The Pendulum Swings Back
Two years after the Supreme Court's pronouncements in the
1982 trilogy of state action cases, the United States Court of Appeals
74. Id. at 1011.
75. Id.
76. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
77. Id. at 942.
78. Id. at 927 n.6.
79. Id. at 937.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 941.
82. Id. at 942.
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for the Fourth Circuit became the first federal appellate court to find
state action lacking in the operation of the NCAA with its decision in
Arlosoroff v. NCAA.83 The Fourth Circuit commenced its analysis of
whether the NCAA had engaged in state action by recognizing that
most of the courts considering the matter had held that the NCAA's
activities did constitute state action. 4
The Fourth Circuit announced its departure from that majority
view, stating: "These earlier cases rested upon the notion that indi-
rect involvement of state governments could convert what otherwise
would be considered private conduct into state action. That notion
has now been rejected by the Supreme Court, however, and its deci-
sions require a different conclusion. ' 85 After concluding that "[i]t is
not enough that an institution is highly regulated and subsidized by a
state,"'8 6 the court provided the following test to determine whether
state action was present: "If the state in its regulatory or subsidizing
function does not order or cause the action complained of, and the
function is not one traditionally reserved to the state, there is no state
action.
' 87
The Arlosoroff court held that the first prong of the test was not
met because there was no indication that the representatives of state
institutions joined together to vote as a bloc in order to adopt the
83. 746 F.2d 1019, 1022 (4th Cir. 1984). The holding in Arlosoroff was perhaps
foreshadowed by the decision of the First Circuit in Spath v. NCAA, 728 F.2d 25 (1st Cir.
1984). Although the Spath court explicitly refused to reach the issue of state action, the court
stated: "While hitherto the weight of authority would support plaintiff that NCAA is
sufficiently state connected to incur 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability, . . .recent trends have limited
that concept." Id. at 28 (citations omitted).
84. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1021 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d
352 (8th Cir. 1977); Howard Univ. v. NCAA, 510 F.2d 213 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Parish v.
NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975); Associated Students, Inc. v. NCAA, 493 F.2d 1251
(9th Cir. 1974)). The court noted that these cases had found state action based on the "nexus"
and "public function" theories. Id.; see also supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
85. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1021 (citing Blum v. Yaretzky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Rendell-
Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982)).
86. Id. at 1022.
87. Id. Although not explicitly stated, the test formulated by the court of appeals in this
case seems to follow the two-pronged test articulated in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922, 937 (1982). The Arlosoroff test, however, imposes an even stricter standard for finding
state action. First, the requirement that the state "order or cause the action complained of"
seems to require more on the part of the state than what Lugar's first prong contemplated. See
id. In Lugar, for instance, the first prong was met merely by virtue of the state's creation of a
procedure which a private party was free to use. In Lugar, there was no suggestion that the
state had "ordered" a private party to use that procedure, as the Arlosoroff test would seem to
require. Second, the Lugar test apparently recognizes that all of the traditional theories for
finding state action (nexus, public function, state encouragement, etc.) are available for
satisfying the second prong. See id. The second prong of Arlosoroff, on the other hand, would
only find state action if a public function was involved. 746 F.2d at 1021.
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challenged conduct over the objection of private institutions."8 The
court also held that the second prong was not met because the regula-
tion of intercollegiate athletics was not a function " 'traditionally
exclusively reserved to the state.' ,89
Since the Fourth Circuit's decision in Arlosoroff, virtually every
court to consider the issue of the NCAA's constitutional status has
adopted the reasoning suggested by Arlosoroff and has concluded that
the NCAA is not a state actor.9° The sole exception to this recent
88. Arlosoroff, 746 F.2d at 1022.
89. Id. at 1021 (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1975)). The
Arlosoroff court's interpretation of the public function requirement with respect to the
regulation of intercollegiate athletics is more consistent with the United States Supreme
Court's recent pronouncements on that issue, where the trend has been to restrict the number
of activities that will qualify as a traditional exclusive state function. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker
v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (the operation of a school is not a public function); Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1975) (distribution of electricity by a regulated utility
is not a public function).
90. See McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1346 (5th Cir. 1988); Karmanos v. Baker,
816 F.2d 258, 260-61 (6th Cir. 1987); Graham v. NCAA, 804 F.2d 953, 957-58 (6th Cir. 1986);
O'Halloran v. University of Wash., 679 F. Supp. 997, 1001-02 (W.D. Wash. 1988); Hawkins v.
NCAA, 652 F. Supp. 602, 605-09 (C.D. I11. 1987); Barbay v. NCAA, No. 86-5697 (E.D. La.
Jan. 20, 1987) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database); Kneeland v. NCAA, 650 F. Supp. 1047, 1054-
55 (W.D. Tex. 1986); McHale v. Cornell Univ., 620 F. Supp. 67, 69-70 (N.D.N.Y. 1985); see
also Ponce v. Basketball Fed'n, 760 F.2d 375 (1st Cir. 1985) (The court applied, the Rendell-
Baker and Blum decisions in finding that the actions of the Basketball Federation of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a private sporting organization which discriminated on the
basis of citizenship, did not constitute state action under either the nexus, public function, or
symbiotic relationship theories.); Johnson v. Educational Testing Serv., 754 F.2d 20, 24-25 (1st
Cir. 1984) (The court, citing Arlosoroffs application of the Blum and Rendell-Baker decisions,
found that the actions of the Educational Testing Service, a private entity, did not constitute
state action.).
Commentators, on the other hand, have not been as receptive to Arlosoroff s
interpretation of Blum and Rendell-Baker in the context of the NCAA. One commentator has
stated: "Although recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court seem to have
narrowed the reach of the state action doctrine, that arguable narrowing would not foreclose
the application of the state action principle to the NCAA." Greene, The New NCAA Rules of
the Game: Academic Integrity or Racism?, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 101, 124 (1984) (citation
omitted). First, "[a] careful reading of ... [recent decisions] reinforces the view that findings
of state action are likely to be based on factual idiosyncracies rather than clear principles." Id.
at 125. Second, even in light of the "tentatively emerging requirement that the state must
explicitly approve of private rules and cooperate in their implementation, it is nonetheless
appropriate to subject the NCAA to the constitutional limitations." Id. at 127. This is
because the NCAA adopts rules through a process in which representatives from both public
and private institutions participate and the rules, once adopted, are adhered to by all member
institutions, both public and private. Id. The members of the current Court "have voiced
their approval of the application of the [state action] doctrine when escape from the private
rules complained of is virtually impossible because of state adherence to the rules, or when
state activity encourages the private rules." Id. at 126.
Another commentator has also expressed his disapproval of the Arlosoroff decision,
accusing those which have followed Arlosoroff of boarding a "judicial bandwagon." Martin,
The NCAA and Its Student-Athletes." Is There Still State Action, 21 NEw ENG. 49, 70 (1986).
Arguing that the applicability of Rendell-Baker and Blum to the NCAA is dubious, Judge
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trend has been the decision of the Nevada Supreme Court in
Tarkanian v. NCAA. 9 1 The Nevada Supreme Court based its finding
that the NCAA was a state actor on two grounds. First, the court
stated that the NCAA, in disciplining a public employee, was per-
forming a function that is "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of
the state."' 92 Second, the court declared that the two-part approach
articulated in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.9" required a conclusion
that state action was present:
The first prong is met because no third party could impose discipli-
nary sanctions upon a state university employee unless the third
party received the right or privilege from the university. Thus, the
deprivation which Tarkanian alleges is caused by the exercise of a
right or privilege created by the state. Also, in the instant case,
both UNLV and the NCAA must be considered state actors. By
delegating authority to the NCAA over athletic personnel deci-
sions and by imposing the NCAA sanctions against Tarkanian,
UNLV acted jointly with the NCAA.94
III. NCAA v. TARKANIAN: THE NCAA's ISSUANCE OF A "SHOW
CAUSE" ORDER DID NOT CONSTITUTE STATE ACTION
In NCAA v. Tarkanian,95 the Supreme Court addressed the issue
of the status of the NCAA as either a private or a state actor for the
first time. In an opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Court held
that the NCAA did not engage in state action when it requested that
the UNLV, one of the NCAA's public member institutions, show
cause why additional penalties should not be imposed against it if the
UNLV failed to remove Tarkanian from the university's intercollegi-
ate athletic program during its probation period. 96 Because state
action was absent, the NCAA could not be held liable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for the violation of Coach Tarkanian's civil rights.97
The Court commenced its discussion by indicating that this case
"uniquely mirror[ed] the traditional state action case"98 and that it
Martin states that the NCAA "receives from its member institutions delegated powers of a
breadth and scope unknown to one small urban school or physician's committee, important
though their work be." Id. at 71. Judge Martin argues that by delegating those powers to a
private party, a state institution transforms the private action into state action. Id. at 73-75.
91. 103 Nev. 331, 741 P.2d 1345 (1987).
92. Id. at 337, 741 P.2d at 1348. The court pointed out that both Blum and Rendell-Baker
had recognized this as a basis for finding state action. Id.
93. 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982), cited in Tarkanian, 103 Nev. at 337, 741 P.2d at 1349.
94. Tarkanian, 103 Nev. at 337, 741 P.2d at 1349.
95. 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988).
96. Id. at 465-66.
97. Id. at 465.
98. Id. at 462.
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would have to "step through an analytical looking glass to resolve
it." 99 The Court distinguished the state action issue in the case at bar
from more conventional cases, stating:
In the typical case raising a state action issue, a private party has
taken the decisive step that caused the harm to the plaintiff, and
the question is whether the State was sufficiently involved to treat
that decisive conduct as state action ....
* . .Here the final act challenged by Tarkanian-his suspen-
sion-was committed by UNLV ....
.. Thus the question is not whether UNLV participated to a
critical extent in the NCAA's activities, but whether UNLV's
actions in compliance with the NCAA rules and recommendations
turned the NCAA's conduct into state action."
Despite indicating that it considered the circumstances of this
case to be unique, the Court did not indicate that a correspondingly
unique mode of analysis was required. 10 ' The Court instead pro-
ceeded to examine the relationship between the UNLV and the
NCAA in its rulemaking capacity."12
Although the Court acknowledged that the UNLV must have
had some impact on the NCAA's policy determinations, the Court
pointed out that the remaining several hundred public and private
institutions which were members of the NCAA each similarly affected
those policies. The Court therefore concluded that "[i]t necessarily
follows that the source of the legislation adopted by the NCAA is not
Nevada but the collective membership, speaking through an organiza-
tion that is independent of any particular State."'0 3 The Court fur-
ther found that the UNLV's embracement of the NCAA's rules did
not transform those rules into "state" rules nor the NCAA into a
"state" actor."° The Court observed that the UNLV retained its
authority both to withdraw from the NCAA and establish its own
standards or, alternatively, to stay in the NCAA and work through its
procedures to amend unfair rules or standards. 0
Tarkanian asserted that "the NCAA's investigation, enforcement
proceedings, and consequent recommendations constituted state
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. The Court, in fact, resorted to the traditional tests that it had developed over the
years to determine whether state action exists in a particular case. Id.
102. Id. Although not explicitly stated, the Court's analysis of the state action issue in this
case appears to be an application of the two-pronged test announced in Lugar. See infra note
202.
103. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 462.
104. Id. at 463.
105. Id.
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action because they resulted from a delegation of power" by the state
of Nevada through the UNLV.106 Although the Court accepted the
proposition that a state may delegate authority to a private party and
thereby make that party a state actor, the Court rejected that argu-
ment as applied to the facts of this case on two grounds. First, the
Court noted that the "UNLV delegated no power to the NCAA to
take specific action against any University employee," but rather
"[tihe commitment by UNLV to adhere to NCAA enforcement pro-
cedures was enforceable only by sanctions that the NCAA might
impose on UNLV itself."0 7 The Court observed that the Confidential
Report issued by the NCAA's Committee on Infractions did not
expressly demand Tarkanian's unconditional suspension, but rather
requested that the UNLV "'show cause' why the NCAA should not
impose additional penalties if UNLV declines to suspend
Tarkanian."' L The Court was not persuaded by Tarkanian's argu-
ment that the power of the NCAA is so great that the UNLV had no
reasonable alternative but to comply with its demands. The Court
stated that, even assuming "that a private monopolist can impose its
will on a state agency by a threatened refusal to deal with it, it does
not follow that such a private party is therefore acting under color of
state law."' 0 9
Tarkanian's second theory-that the UNLV's delegation of
power to the NCAA transformed the latter into a state actor-was
also rejected. The Court reasoned that "[d]uring the several years
that the NCAA investigated the alleged violations, the NCAA and
UNLV acted much more like adversaries than like partners engaged
in a dispassionate search for the truth."" 0 The Court further stated
that "[i]t would be ironic indeed to conclude that the NCAA's impo-
sition of sanctions against UNLV-sanctions that UNLV and its
counsel, including the Attorney General of Nevada, steadfastly
opposed during protracted adversary proceedings-[were] fairly
attributable to the State of Nevada.""'
The Court also rejected Tarkanian's third argument-that the
106. Id.
107. Id. at 464.
108. Id. at 465; see supra text accompanying note 15.
109. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 465.
110. Id. at 464.
Il1. Id. at 465. The Court cited Polk County v. Dodson, which held that "a state-
compensated public defender acts in a private capacity when she represents a private client in a
conflict against the State." 454 U.S. 312, 320 (1981). Analogizing from Dodson, the
Tarkanian Court concluded that "the NCAA is properly viewed as a private actor at odds
with the State when it represents the interests of its entire membership in an investigation of
one public university." Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 464.
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NCAA had disciplined a state employee and thereby engaged in state
action by performing a function traditionally reserved exclusively to
the state when it issued its order to show cause.1 12 Again, the Court
reasoned that the NCAA's own legislation prohibited it from taking
any direct action against Tarkanian and further noted that
Tarkanian's suspension was but one of many recommendations in the
NCAA's Confidential Report. " 3 Finally, the Court rejected the argu-
ment that the NCAA was a state actor by virtue of its joint participa-
tion in Tarkanian's suspension.' 14  The Court distinguished the
present case from Dennis v. Sparks'15 and Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co.," 6 on which Tarkanian relied, on the ground that the joint partic-
ipation in those cases was founded on a corrupt agreement between
the private party and the state actor, whereas in the present case no
such corrupt agreement existed.117
The Court concluded by stating that "[iln the final analysis the
question is whether 'the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a
federal right [can] be fairly attributable to the State.' "118 The Court
answered in the negative, holding that the UNLV had conducted its
athletic program under color of the policies adopted by the NCAA,
rather than the NCAA developing and enforcing those policies under
color of Nevada law."19
Justice White, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and O'Connor, argued that the NCAA acted jointly with
the UNLV in suspending Tarkanian and thereby became a state
actor.' 2 ° Although Justice White agreed with the majority of the
Court that this case was different on its facts from many of the
Court's prior state action decisions, he stated that this situation was
not unknown or unique. 12 1 Specifically, Justice White observed that
in both Adickes' 22 and Dennis,123 the Court faced the question of
whether private parties could be held to be state actors in cases in
which the final or decisive act was carried out by a state official. 124 In
112. Id. at 465 n.18.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 464 n.16.
115. 449 U.S. 24 (1980); see infra notes 179-83 and accompanying text.
116. 398 U.S. 144 (1970); see infra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
117. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 464 n.17.
118. Id. at 465 (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 466 (White, J., dissenting).
121. Id.
122. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
123. Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980).
124. See Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 466 (White, J., dissenting).
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both of those cases, the Court held that private parties could be found
to be state actors if they were " 'jointly engaged with state officials in
the challenged action.' 125 In this case, Justice White argued, "it was
the NCAA's findings that Tarkanian had violated NCAA rules, made
at NCAA-conducted hearings, all of which were agreed to by UNLV
in its membership agreement with the NCAA, that resulted in
Tarkanian's suspension by UNLV."' 126  Justice White concluded:
"On these facts, the NCAA was 'jointly engaged with [UNLV] offi-
cials in the challenged action.' ",127
IV. COMMENT
A. Tarkanian Is Inconsistent with Prior State Action Doctrine
Prior to Tarkanian, most of the federal circuit courts had
addressed the issue of the NCAA's status as a private or state actor,1
28
with a clear trend developing among these courts toward a finding
that the NCAA is a private actor. Indeed, several of the courts that
had previously found the NCAA to be a state actor have subsequently
reversed their positions and found no state action present.' 29 Despite
this apparent lack of conflict among the circuits, however, the United
States Supreme Court decided to hear Tarkanian.3 ° The Supreme
Court held that the NCAA was not a state actor. In reaching this
decision, the Court rejected arguments that the NCAA should be held
to be a state actor under either the "delegation" theory or the "joint
action" theory. The Court's reasoning, however, is inconsistent with
prior decisions and reflects a rigid, formalistic attitude toward the res-
olution of state action issues.
1. THE DELEGATION THEORY
The first ground relied upon by the Court in finding that the
125. Id. (quoting Dennis, 449 U.S. at 27-28).
126. Id. at 467.
127. Id. (quoting Dennis, 449 U.S. at 27-28).
128. See supra notes 28-47 & 83-94 and accompanying text.
129. Compare McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988) (NCAA is a private
actor) and Ponce v. Basketball Fed'n, 760 F.2d 375 (1st Cir. 1985) (basketball federation is a
private actor) with Rivas Tenorio v. Liga Atletica Interuniversitaria, 554 F.2d 492 (Ist Cir.
1977) (intercollegiate athletic league is a state actor) and Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th
Cir. 1975) (NCAA is a state actor).
130. One possible explanation for the Court's interest in this particular case is that it
presented several arguments that had not been extensively considered in the earlier NCAA
state action cases. In this case, Tarkanian argued that the NCAA should be held to be a state
actor under the "delegation" theory and the "joint action" theory. The Tarkanian Court may
have felt that these theories might persuade some of those courts following the new tide of
decisions to break from the growing trend, thereby creating a split among the circuits.
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NCAA did not engage in state action was that the NCAA's activities
were not carried out under color of Nevada law. According to the
Court, "the source of the legislation adopted by the NCAA is not
Nevada [law] but rather the collective membership speaking through
an organization that is independent of any particular State." '
Although the NCAA's legislation could not be considered Nevada
law, the Court nonetheless recognized that it was possible that the
state of Nevada could-through its actions-transform the NCAA
legislation into Nevada law.'32
One theory that has been advocated by several commentators,
33
but that has not received a great deal of attention from the courts, is
that a state institution, by delegating a particular decision to a private
party and agreeing to abide by it, transforms the private decision into
state action.134 Weistart and Lowell, in their prominent textbook on
sports law, have articulated the delegation argument as follows:
[T]he important underlying issue [in the NCAA cases] may be one
of delegation. State educational institutions present the clearest
examples. At a state school, the state has a close and continuing
relationship with its student-athletes. That relationship imposes
certain prerogatives and responsibilities, including a right to define
eligibility. If the state executes these itself, there should be no
question that there is state action present and that constitutional
norms must be satisfied. The critical question to be examined is
whether the state's constitutional duty ends when the state agrees
to have standards of conduct and eligibility defined in a collective
venture in which it participates. It is likely that there are limits on
the extent to which the state can use the delegation device to con-
131. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 462. Similar reasoning appears in the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Arlosoroff, which held that absent a showing that the representatives of state
institutions belonging to the NCAA had joined together to vote as a bloc to effect a particular
result over the objection of private institutions, there could be "no showing that the state
institutions controlled or directed the result"; hence, there was no state action. Arlosoroff v.
NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019, 1022 (4th Cir. 1984).
132. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 462-63.
133. See 3. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS § 1.14, at 8 (Supp. 1985);
Greene, The New NCAA Rules of the Game: Academic Integrity or Racism?, 28 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 101, 126-27 (1984); Martin, supra note 90, at 73-75.
134. In Parish v. NCAA, the court of appeals noted that although one could not point to one
state or governmental body that controls or directs the NCAA, "[n]evertheless, it would be
strange doctrine indeed to hold that the states could avoid the restrictions placed upon them
by the Constitution by banding together to form or to support a 'private' organization to which
they have relinquished some portion of their governmental power." 506 F.2d 1028, 1033 (5th
Cir. 1975). Only one subsequent NCAA case dealing with the state action issue has considered
this delegation theory as a possible basis for finding state action. See Howard Univ. v. NCAA,
510 F.2d 213, 219 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (The theory of state action through the delegation of a
public function was not helpful in resolving the question of "entanglement through dominant
membership and participation.").
1989]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
fine its obligations. The prospect of a continuing constitutional
duty seems especially strong in those situations in which the state
agrees to have the NCAA apply to its athletes standards devised by
the latter group.
135
This reasoning is equally applicable to the situation in
Tarkanian, in which one of the conditions that the state accepted in
becoming a member of the NCAA was its delegation to the NCAA of
the authority to discipline a state employee. 36 The Supreme Court in
Tarkanian clearly accepted the view that a state institution cannot
shield itself from liability for constitutional violations based on its
affiliation with a nominally private organization, such as the
NCAA. 3 The Court refused, however, to move from this conclusion
to the idea that the NCAA itself should be liable as a state actor.
1 38
Although the Court implicitly acknowledged the theoretical
validity of this argument, it rejected the application of this argument
to the facts of the case at bar. First, the Court emphasized that the
UNLV had not delegated to the NCAA the power to exercise any
direct action against Tarkanian.139 Second, the Court stated that the
UNLV and the NCAA had been adversaries throughout the proceed-
ings in this case. The Court concluded, therefore, that the NCAA
could not be considered the UNLV's agent.' 4 ' The Court's rejection
of the delegation argument exemplifies the strict approach that the
Court has taken in recent years in an apparent attempt to limit the
scope of the state action doctrine.142
The Court's first reason for rejecting the application of the dele-
135. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 133, § 1.14, at 8 (Supp. 1985).
136. The UNLV, in becoming a member of the NCAA, contractually agreed to administer
its athletic programs in accordance with NCAA "legislation," which includes the NCAA's
enforcement procedures. See supra note 6. The NCAA enforcement procedures, in turn,
called for the suspension-hence disciplining-of Tarkanian, a state employee.
137. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454, 462 (1988). The Court stated: "A state
university without question is a state actor. When it decides to impose a serious disciplinary
sanction upon one of its tenured employees, it must comply with the terms of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution." Id.
138. Id. at 465.
139. Id. at 464.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. One commentator has argued that despite the Supreme Court's inability to articulate a
consistent state action doctrine, the cases can "be understood by examining changes in the
relative importance which the Court has attributed to either of two objectives which underlie
the state action doctrine: federalism and satisfaction of public expectations." Schneider, supra
note 33, at 737. Professor Schneider identifies three broad movements in the evolution of the
state action doctrine: (1) in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the state action
concept was grounded on federalism principles and was very limited; (2) during the Vinson
and Warren Court era, the state action concept was expanded when the focus shifted from
federalism to fulfilling public expectations; and (3) during the Burger Court era, the Court has
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gation theory for finding state action (that the NCAA did not have
the power to take any direct action against Tarkanian)'43 is based
upon the naive assumption that the UNLV acted voluntarily in sus-
pending Tarkanian. This assumption is naive because the NCAA, as
the premier intercollegiate athletic association in the United States,
exercises a great deal of influence over its member institutions. As
one commentator has recognized:
There is no alternative for the institution seeking any real form of,
athletic prominence. Televised football appearances provide not
only network money but alumni contributions and easier recruiting
for future teams. In the high pressure sport of major intercollegi-
ate basketball, there is no substitute for the season end NCAA
tournament. To varying degrees, this holds true in the other inter-
collegiate sports."
If the UNLV sought to maintain its athletic prominence, it had
little practical alternative to complying with the NCAA's recommen-
dation that it suspend Tarkanian. Hence, it was not surprising when
the UNLV's vice president recommended that the university exercise
its "option" to suspend Tarkanian rather than face additional penal-
ties, including expulsion from the NCAA.'45 The Court summarily
dismissed Tarkanian's argument that the UNLV had no practical
alternative to the NCAA's demands, stating: "The University's desire
to remain a powerhouse among the nation's college basketball teams
is understandable, and nonmembership in the NCAA obviously
would thwart that goal. But that UNLV's options were unpalatable
does not mean that they were nonexistent.
146
The summary disposal of this issue is certainly a striking contrast
to the Court's attitude toward state action issues in earlier years. For
instance, the Court's decision in Terry v. Adams 147 exemplifies an ear-
lier era in state action doctrine in which the Court was far more will-
ing to consider the dynamics of a situation in analyzing the state
retreated to a narrow concept of state action in an effort to restrain federal judicial power. Id.
at 738.
Another commentator has also written on the Burger Court's impact on the state action
doctrine. See Phillips, supra note 5, at 700. Professor Phillips stated:
After more than ten years of Burger Court activity ... it is evident that the
reach of state action has been substantially curtailed. Although few of the earlier
landmarks have been expressly overruled, and litigants can still invoke their
support, the Supreme Court now appears disinclined to give them a wide reading.
Id. at 718-19 (footnotes omitted).
143. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 465.
144. Martin, The NCAA and the Fourteenth Amendment, I 1 NEw ENG. 383, 392 (1976).
145. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 459.
146. Id. at 465 n. 19.
147. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
1989]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
action issue. In Terry, qualified black voters of a Texas county
brought suit against the Jaybird Democratic Association, a "self-gov-
erning voluntary club" composed exclusively of white Texas Demo-
crats, in order to challenge that group's practice of excluding blacks
from voting in the pre-primary elections held by the Association prior
to the state primary elections. ' 48 In order to succeed on their fifteenth
amendment 149 challenge, the petitioners had to show that the Jaybird
Democratic Association's activities constituted state action. 5 ° In
their attempt to defeat the petitioners' constitutional claim, the
Jaybird Democratic Association argued, as did the NCAA in
Tarkanian, that the Association was a "mere private group."151
The Terry Court held that the Jaybird Democratic Association's
"private" elections constituted state action because the state primary
and general elections had "become no more than the perfunctory
ratifiers of the choice that [had] already been made in Jaybird elec-
tions from which Negroes [had] been excluded."'' 52 The Court fur-
ther declared that it was "immaterial that the state [did] not control
that part of [the] elective process" that the Jaybirds managed because
the Jaybird primary had become, in effect, an integral part of the elec-
tive process that determined who would govern the county.'53 The
Court attributed great significance to the fact that for more than fifty
years, the Association's county-wide candidates had invariably been
nominated in the Democratic primaries and elected to office. 1
5 4
Although the Jaybird Democratic Association could not directly,
without official state elections, place its candidates in public office, the
Terry Court focused on the reality of the situation before it and found
that the Association had engaged in state action.' 55 The Tarkanian
Court took the opposite position, however, partly basing its finding of
no state action on the NCAA's inability to directly discipline an
employee at a state university. 56 As Justice Marshall remarked in
1
148. Id. at 463.
149. The amendment provides, in relevant part: "The right of citizens of the United States
to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race,
color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
150. Terry, 345 U.S. at 473.
151. Id. at 466.
152. Id. at 469.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 463.
155. Id. at 469. Tarkanian had advanced this same kind of argument in support of his
proposition that the NCAA was a state actor. Brief for the Respondent at 35-37, NCAA v.
Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988) (No. 87-1061). The Court, however, rejected this argument
in the majority opinion.
156. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454, 465 (1988).
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Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,"' the "decision in this case marks a return to
empty formalism in state action doctrine."'
' 58
The Tarkanian Court's second reason for not finding the delega-
tion argument persuasive was that the UNLV and the NCAA were
adversaries throughout the proceedings. This reasoning is problem-
atic because the relationship between the parties was, at least on a
formal basis, one of cooperation. By virtue of its membership in the
NCAA, the UNLV became contractually bound to abide by the
NCAA's enforcement penalties in compliance with the NCAA's fun-
damental policy that member institutions are obligated to apply and
enforce NCAA legislation and enforcement piograms. 59
Further evidence of the cooperative enterprise contemplated by
the UNLV and the NCAA may be found in the correspondence from
the NCAA to the UNLV at the time that the NCAA first alleged that
the UNLV may have committed violations. As part of its investiga-
tion, the NCAA asked the UNLV to conduct its own investigation of
the alleged misconduct. 110 The NCAA Assistant Executive Director
stated that the enforcement program of the NCAA was a cooperative
undertaking involving the NCAA and member institutions and that
" 'the responsibility of the University is to objectively, rather than
defensively, investigate the allegations to determine the facts, regard-
less of the results.' "161 The Director further stated: "Accordingly,
157. 457 U.S. 830, 852 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
158. Id. The Tarkanian Court also rejected the argument that the NCAA, in disciplining
Tarkanian, had performed a "public function" and had hence become a state actor, pointing
out that the NCAA's own legislation prohibited it from taking any direct action against
Tarkanian. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 465 n.18. The Court further noted that Tarkanian's
suspension was but "one of many" recommendations in the NCAA's confidential report. Id.
The Tarkanian Court's rejection of the "public function" argument based on a
requirement of direct action is subject to the same criticisms mentioned above with regard to
the Court's rejection of the delegation argument. See supra note 131-67 and accompanying
text. The Court overlooked the fact that, given the relative power of the NCAA and the
UNLV, the NCAA's request that the UNLV suspend Tarkanian was for all practical purposes
the equivalent of the NCAA directly disciplining him. Ironically, this was one of the rare
instances in which there was indeed a function "traditionally exclusively reserved to the state."
See Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 465 n. 18. The Supreme Court has in recent years severely limited
the scope of what may be considered a public function for state action purposes. See, e.g.,
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (The Court required, for the first
time, that a function be one that has not only been traditionally, but also exclusively performed
by the state in order to constitute state action.).
159. The NCAA's Official Procedure Governing the NCAA Enforcement Program
provides: " 'All representatives of educational institutions are expected to cooperate fully with
the NCAA investigative staff, Committee on Infractions and Council to further the objectives
of the Association and its enforcement program.' " Brief for the Respondent at 3, NCAA v.
Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988) (No. 87-1061) (citation omitted).
160. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 458.
161. Brief for the Respondent at 8, Tarkanian (No. 87-1061) (quoting from trial exhibit).
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the 'burden of proof' is shared jointly by both the NCAA enforce-
ment staff and the institution. It is not a prosecutor-defense legal pro-
ceeding; rather, it is a cooperative administrative effort ... designed
to place the responsibility for determining facts on both the institution
and the enforcement staff .... 162
The Court concluded, however, that the UNLV could not be
considered an agent of the NCAA for purposes of the enforcement
proceedings.163 Rather than holding that the NCAA and the UNLV
acted jointly pursuant to their contractual relationship in suspending
Tarkanian, the Court looked beyond the parties' formal relationship
and focused on what really occurred. The Court stated that "[d]uring
the several years that the NCAA investigated the alleged violations,
the NCAA and the UNLV acted much more like adversaries than
like partners engaged in a dispassionate search for the truth."' 164
The Court, however, was not sufficiently thorough in applying
this substance-over-form approach. For while it is true that the
UNLV "used its best efforts to retain its winning coach,"' 165 the fact
remains that the UNLV, faced with the threat of severe sanctions
against the university, ultimately carried out the NCAA's wishes
when it notified Tarkanian that he was to be "'completely severed of
any and all relations, formal or informal, with the University's Inter-
collegiate athletic program during the period of the University's
NCAA probation.' ",166 As Justice White's dissent concluded, "[t]he
key ... is that ultimately the parties agreed to take the action." '167
2. THE JOINT ACTION THEORY
The Tarkanian Court also rejected the argument that the NCAA
became a state actor by becoming a joint participant with the UNLV
in suspending Tarkanian.161 This joint action theory, the vitality of
which was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court's decision in Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co. ,169 does not appear in the discussion of any of the
reported NCAA cases dealing with the issue of state action. Despite
this lack of precedent, the joint action theory was central to
Tarkanian's argument before the Supreme Court.' 70 The Tarkanian
162. Id. at 9.
163. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 464.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 459 (quoting Joint Appendix at 70, Tarkanian (No. 87-1061)).
167. Id. at 468 (White, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 464 n.16.
169. 457 U.S. 922 (1982). For a discussion of Lugar, see supra notes 76-82 and
accompanying text.
170. Brief for the Respondent at 24-46, Tarkanian (No. 87-1061).
[Vol. 44:197
NCAA AND STATE ACTION
Court's cursory treatment of this theory-which alone should have
been sufficient to support a finding of state action17 '-rested on its
distinction of Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. 172 and Dennis v. Sparks,
173
two prior Supreme Court decisions that found state action based on
the joint participation by a private individual and the state in prohib-
ited activity. The Tarkanian Court distinguished those cases on the
ground that the joint participation in those cases was founded on a
corrupt agreement between the private party and the state actor; no
such corrupt agreement existed in Tarkanian."
In Adickes, a white school teacher was refused service in a pri-
vate restaurant when she was accompanied by six black students; she
was thereafter arrested for vagrancy upon leaving the premises.
175
She filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to recover damages, alleging
that she was discriminated against solely on the basis of race in viola-
tion of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution. 176  In order to succeed on her Section
1983 claim, the petitioner had to establish that the deprivation was
somehow caused by state action. The Supreme Court stated that the
petitioner could establish the requisite state action "if she [could]
prove that a Kress employee, in the course of employment, and a Hat-
tiesburg policeman somehow reached an understanding to deny Miss
Adickes service in the Kress store, or to cause her subsequent arrest
because she was a white person in the company of Negroes."' 177 The
Court then stated:
The involvement of a state official in such a conspiracy plainly
provides the state action essential to show a direct violation of peti-
tioner's Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights, whether
or not the actions of the police were officially authorized, or lawful
.... Moreover, a private party involved in such a conspiracy, even
though not'an official of the State, can be liable under § 1983.178
The reasoning of the Adickes case was again applied by the
171. See infra notes 205-16 and accompanying text.
172. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
173. 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
174. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 464 n.17.
175. Adickes, 398 U.S. at 146.
176. Id. The petitioner's complaint had two counts, each based on Section 1983 and each
alleging that the respondent, a private entity, had deprived petitioner of the right "not to be
discriminated against on the basis of race." Id. at 147. The first count stated that she had been
refused service because she was a "Caucasian in the company of Negroes"; she sought to prove
that the refusal to serve her was pursuant to a custom of the community to segregate races in
public eating places. The second count stated that the refusal of service and the arrest were the
product of a conspiracy between the respondent and the police. Id. at 148.
177. Id. at 152.
178. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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Supreme Court in Dennis v. Sparks. 79 In Dennis, a state trial judge
enjoined the production of minerals from oil leases owned by the
plaintiff.' ° On appeal, the injunction was dissolved as having been
illegally issued. The plaintiff then filed an action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, naming as defendants the Duval County Ranch Co. (the party
that obtained the injunction against the plaintiff), the sole owner of
the corporation, the judge who entered the injunction, and the two
individual sureties on the injunction bond.'' The plaintiff's primary
claim was that the injunction had been "corruptly issued as the result
of a conspiracy between the judge and the other defendants" and that
this joint activity constituted a deprivation of his property without
due process of law."8 2 The Court accepted the plaintiff's argument
and stated: "It is enough that [a private defendant] is a willful partici-
pant in joint action with the State or its agents. Private persons,
jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action, are acting
'under color' of law for purposes of § 1983 actions."' 8 3
The Court distinguished the situations in Adickes and Dennis
from the situation in Tarkanian based on the fact that those cases
involved corrupt agreements between the private party and the state.
The Court stated:
In this case there is no suggestion of any impropriety respecting the
agreement between the NCAA and UNLV. Indeed the dissent
seems to assume that the NCAA's liability as a state actor
depended not on its initial agreement with UNLV, but on whether
UNLV ultimately accepted the NCAA's recommended discipline
of Tarkanian. In contrast, the conspirators in Dennis became state
actors when they formed the corrupt bargain with the judge, and
remained so through completion of the conspiracy's objectives.
1 84
The distinction is truly without merit. Although the Court was
correct in pointing out that the agreement between the UNLV and the
NCAA was not invalid from the time of its inception, the Court failed
to indicate why this distinction should make any difference. Dennis
and Adickes did not require the corrupt agreement between the state
and the private party to have existed for any specified period of time
before the challenged action took place. 85 Rather, those cases
179. 449 U.S. 24 (1980).
180. Id. at 25.
181. Id. at 25-26.
182. Id. at 26.
183. Id. at 27-28 (citations omitted).
184. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 464 n.17 (citation omitted).
185. Dennis, 449 U.S. at 27-29; Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150-52 (1970).
Neither of those cases required that the agreement between the state and the private party be
"corrupt." Apparently, the Tarkanian Court did not believe that the agreement itself had to
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focused on the more germane issue of whether the constitutional vio-
lation resulted from the agreement. The latter approach is the more
straightforward of the two as it goes to the heart of the issue, that is,
whether the challenged conduct was the result of joint participation
between state and private actors, such that the actions of those private
actors could fairly be attributed to the state. 18 6 Hence, the Court's
rejection of the joint action theory is based on yet another formalistic
argument that overlooks the realities of the situation.
The Tarkanian decision clearly reflects the restrictive approach
toward state action that the Supreme Court has followed in recent
years. This Note has argued that the Tarkanian Court's reasoning-
which rejected the "delegation," "public function," and "joint action"
arguments for finding the NCAA to be a state actor-contained doc-
trinal flaws. The decision, however, is not only inconsistent with
prior state action decisions, but it is also flawed as a matter of policy.
Implicit in the Court's discussion is the notion that Tarkanian's
remedy should come from the UNLV and not from the NCAA. The
Court's decision that the NCAA is not a state actor, however, fails to
penalize the party that is most responsible for the asserted constitu-
tional violations-the NCAA. In a situation such as that presented in
this case, a state university's bargaining strength is substantially
weaker than the NCAA's. The state is thus forced to decide whether
it will respect the constitutional rights of one of its citizens, at the risk
of incurring significant NCAA sanctions, or whether it will carry out
the wishes of the NCAA, thereby risking liability under Section 1983.
In the meantime, the NCAA-which has created this dilemma for the
state-is immunized from any liability for violating fourteenth
amendment rights by virtue of its status as a "private" organization.
The Tarkanian Court's decision, in failing to hold the NCAA
accountable for its actions, does little to deter the NCAA from con-
tinuing to exert pressure on public universities, such as the UNLV, to
take constitutionally impermissible actions.
B. Tarkanian Fails to Clarify the Application of
the Lugar Framework
The Supreme Court's decision in Tarkanian is problematic in its
result and in its application of state action doctrine.'87 The case is
be corrupt, as it based its distinction on the time when the cooperative activity took place
rather than on whether the agreement was prima facie invalid. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 464
n.17.
186. See, e.g., Adickes, 398 U.S. at 152.
187. See supra notes 128-86 and accompanying text.
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also problematic, however, on a broader level; it fails to clarify when
and how the two-pronged test announced in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co. 188 is to be applied. This Section analyzes the Tarkanian Court's
application of the Lugar test 8 9 and questions whether the Lugar test,
as applied in Tarkanian, imposes greater requirements for a finding of
state action than traditional state action tests. 9°
There is a general consensus of authority that the state action
doctrine is significantly muddled. 9 ' The Supreme Court itself recog-
nized the difficulty surrounding this area of law when it declared the
formulation of "an infallible test" to be an "impossible task."'1 92
Thus, rather than developing a unitary test, the Court has adopted a
number of approaches that may be applied depending on the particu-
lar facts of each case.
193
In Lugar, the Supreme Court purported for the first time to
develop a unifying framework under which state action issues can be
analyzed. The two-pronged analytical framework announced by the
Lugar Court was not presented as a new state action "test," but rather
was said to emerge from the pattern of earlier state action deci-
sions.' 94 The two-part approach announced by the Court, which con-
tained elements of the traditional state action theories, bore out this
idea that the new framework was a synthesis. The Court stated the
two-pronged test as follows:
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right
or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by
the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible....
Second, the party charged with the deprivation must be a person
who may fairly be said to be a state actor. This may be because he
is a state official, because he has acted together with or has
obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct
is otherwise chargeable to the State. 95
The Court further declared that these two principles, although
related, are not the same:
188. 457 U.S. 932, 937 (1982).
189. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 461-65.
190. See supra note 33 (describing the various theories utilized to extend concept of state
action to nominally private parties).
191. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
192. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967).
193. "Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of
the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance." Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961); see supra note 33 (discussing the various state action tests).
194. The Court stated that its "cases reflect a two-part approach to this question of 'fair
attribution.' " Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 932, 937 (1982).
195. Id.
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They collapse into each other when the claim of a constitutional
deprivation is directed against a party whose official character is
such as to lend the weight of the State to his decisions. The two
principles diverge when the constitutional claim is directed against
a party without such apparent authority, i.e., against a private
party. 1
96
Almost immediately following the emergence of this new analyti-
cal framework for state action issues, the question arose whether the
Lugar analysis would "prove a genuine synthesis or just another test
on the state action list."' 197 A review of the state action cases decided
by the federal courts of appeals since the Supreme Court's decision in
Lugar reveals that the framework announced in Lugar has not
received uniform application--even within each circuit-with some
cases applying Lugar's two-pronged framework' 9" and other cases
ignoring the Lugar framework completely as they apply the tradi-
tional state action tests. 199 Moreover, the Supreme Court's post-
Lugar state action decisions have also been inconsistent in their appli-
cation of the Lugar framework. 2" With this lack of agreement as to
196. Id.
197. See Cobb, State Action Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments: A Brief Review of
Recent Developments, 17 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 533, 535 (1983).
198. See Howard Gault Co. v. Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc., 848 F.2d 544, 554 (5th Cir.
1988); Tarabishi v. McAlester Regional Hosp., 827 F.2d 648, 651-52 (10th Cir. 1987); Albert
v. Carovano, 824 F.2d 1333, 1338-39 (2d Cir. 1987); Roudybush v. Zabel, 813 F.2d 173 (8th
Cir. 1987); Thomas S. v. Morrow, 781 F.2d 367, 377-78 (4th Cir. 1986); Duncan v. Peck, 752
F.2d 1135, 1140-41 (6th Cir. 1985); Cruz v. Donnelly, 727 F.2d 79, 81-82 (3d Cir. 1984); Scott
v. Dixon, 720 F.2d 1542, 1545 (1 1th Cir. 1983); Kolinske v. Lubbers, 712 F.2d 471, 477 (D.C.
Cir. 1983); Gerena v. Puerto Rico Legal Servs., Inc., 697 F.2d 447, 449 (1st Cir. 1983).
199. See Robison v. Canterbury Village, Inc., 848 F.2d 424, 427-30 (3d Cir. 1988);
McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1346 (5th Cir. 1988); Sinn v. Daily Nebraskan, 829
F.2d 662, 664-65 (8th Cir. 1987); Vincent v. Trend W. Technical Corp., 828 F.2d 563, 567-69
(9th Cir. 1987); Carey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 823 F.2d 1402, 1404 (10th Cir. 1987);
Carlin Communication, Inc. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1352, 1357-58 (11th
Cir. 1986); Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 943 (6th Cir. 1985); Mark v. Furay, 769 F.2d 1266,
1272-73 (7th Cir. 1985); Ponce v. Basketball Fed'n, 760 F.2d 375, 377-82 (1st Cir. 1985);
Calvert v. Sharp, 748 F.2d 861, 862-64 (4th Cir. 1984); Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582,
590-94 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
200. The Court's decisions in Blum v. Yaretzky, 457 U.S. 991 (1988), and Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982), announced the same day as the Lugar decision, seem to confirm
the notion that the issue of state action is not to be determined solely by the specific criteria
enunciated in Lugar. Although the Rendell-Baker Court cited Lugar in characterizing the
ultimate issue as to whether the challenged action was "fairly attributable to the State,"
Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 838, the Court decided the issue without following the two-pronged
framework of Lugar. Similarly, the specific framework enunciated in Lugar was absent from
the Court's analysis of the state action issue in Blum. 457 U.S. at 1002-12.
Subsequent state action decisions handed down by the Court have been equally
inconsistent in their application of the Lugar framework. Compare West v. Atkins, 108 S. Ct.
2250, 2255 (1988) (The Court cited and applied the Lugar framework in holding that a
physician who is under contract with the state to provide medical services to inmates at a state
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the proper role of the Lugar analysis in considering the question of
state action-which was reflected in the arguments of counsel in the
Tarkanian case 2'-it would have been helpful if the Tarkanian
Court had offered some guidance on how the Lugar framework
should be applied.
Unfortunately, the Tarkanian Court did nothing to clarify the
application of the Lugar framework in the analysis of state action
issues. Although it recognized that the Nevada Supreme Court had
applied the Lugar test as one of the bases for finding the NCAA to be
a state actor, the United States Supreme Court did not expressly cite
or follow the Lugar test in its state action analysis.2 °2 Given this lack
of consistency in the courts' application of the Lugar framework, an
important question arises as to whether the result achieved by apply-
prison hospital on a part-time basis is a state actor.) with San Francisco Arts & Athletics v.
Olypmic Comm., 107 S. Ct. 2971, 2985-86 (1987) (The Court did not mention or apply the
Lugar framework, but instead went through each of the traditional state action tests-public
function, joint action or significant encouragement, and nexus-in holding that the United
States Olympic Committee was not a state actor.).
201. The petitioner stated that in Lugar the "Court provided an analytical framework
within which the 'facts and circumstances' of each case may be evaluated." Brief for the
Petitioner at 24, NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988) (No. 87-1061). Thus, the
petitioner's argument for not finding state action was centered upon the criteria enunciated in
Lugar. Id. at 26-48. The respondent, on the other hand, argued that state action is not
determined solely by the specific criteria enunciated in Lugar. The respondent argued that the
Lugar framework, which did support a finding of state action in this case, is but one of the
criteria which may be employed in the state action analysis. Brief for the Respondent at 25
n.20, Tarkanian.
202. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454, 461-65 (1988). It could be argued that the
Tarkanian Court applied the first prong of the Lugar test when it sought to determine whether
the source of the challenged conduct-the NCAA's rules and procedures-was the state of
Nevada, that is, whether "the deprivation [was] caused by the exercise of some right or
privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for
whom the State is responsible." Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937, quoted in Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 463
n. 14. The Tarkanian Court held that this requirement was not satisfied and hence concluded
that the NCAA did not engage in state action. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 465. After that,
however, the Court departed from the Lugar framework when it considered and rejected
Tarkanian's arguments that the NCAA should be found to be a state actor based on the
"public function" and "joint action" tests. Id. at 464-65 nn.16-18. If the Tarkanian Court had
applied the Lugar framework, after finding that the first prong of Lugar was not met, it would
not have been necessary to consider two later arguments that the NCAA was a state actor
based on the "public function" and "joint action" tests-which are directed toward satisfying
the second prong of Lugar-because Lugar requires that both prongs be met in order to find
state action. The four dissenting justices took an approach that seemingly ignored the Lugar
framework altogether, adding further to the confusion as to the applicable mode of analysis.
Without considering whether Lugar's first prong was met, the dissent declared that "private
parties could be found to be state actors if they were 'jointly engaged with state officials in the
challenged action.' " Id. at 466 (White, J., dissenting) (citing Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24,
27-28 (1980)). Having found that the NCAA was jointly engaged with the UNLV officials in
the challenged action, the dissent reasoned that the NCAA should have been found to be a
state actor. Id. at 467.
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ing the Lugar framework is different from the result that would be
achieved by applying traditional state action tests. If the Lugar
framework is only an amalgamation of prior state action cases, then
the application of Lugar should not have a significant impact on the
outcome of the state action issue. If, however, the Lugar framework
imposes a new requirement in the state action calculus, then its appli-
cation or non-application becomes a critical issue.
Tarkanian presents a situation in which the Lugar framework
could be viewed as imposing an additional requirement to the tradi-
tional state action tests. Under the Lugar framework, the inquiry
under the first and second prongs "diverge[s] when the constitutional
claim is directed against a . . . private party. '20 3 The NCAA is a
private party; hence, the state action inquiry presumably "diverges,"
requiring that both prongs of Lugar be satisfied for a finding of state
action. Without reference to Lugar, however, the NCAA could be
found to be a state actor under the arguably less stringent "joint
action" test if it was a joint participant with the UNLV in suspending
Tarkanian. Applying the Lugar framework, on the other hand, it
appears that there is an additional requirement that the deprivation
have been caused by the exercise of some state-created right or privi-
lege or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state.2°
Upon further examination, however, one need not necessarily
view the Lugar framework as imposing an additional requirement in
the state action analysis. As an illustration, if the basis for satisfying
the second prong of Lugar-that the person charged with the depriva-
tion be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor-is a claim
that the state was a joint participant in the challenged activity, then it
could be argued that satisfaction of the second prong will implicitly
satisfy the first prong, thereby imposing no additional requirement.
The Fourth Circuit recently took this position in Jackson v.
Pantazes.2
05
In Pantazes, a homeowner brought a Section 1983 action against
a bail bondsman and a police officer to recover damages for personal
injuries and property damage that she sustained from the bondsman's
attempt to apprehend her son.2°6 The court stated that the threshold
issue was whether the bondsman was a state actor. 2°7 Noting that the
Lugar framework "delineated the appropriate method for analyzing
203. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 932, 937 (1982).
204. See id. at 937-39.
205. 810 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1987).
206. Id. at 427.
207. Id. at 428. The court stated that with respect to the police officer, it was readily
apparent that he was a state actor. Id.
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the issue of whether a party is a state actor so as to be subject to suit
under § 1983,"20' the court held that both prongs were met and con-
cluded that the bondsman was a state actor.2 ° 9 The first prong was
met because, in seeking to apprehend the plaintiff's son, who was a
fugitive from justice, the bondsman "was exercising powers conferred
on him by state law."2 1 The second prong articulated by Lugar was
also satisfied because the bondsman "obtained significant aid from...
the police officer, who was unquestionably exercising state
authority."2 I I
The court then stated: "Indeed, in cases where a private party
and a public official act jointly to produce the constitutional violation,
both parts of the Lugar test are simultaneously satisfied . ,,2. 2 The
Fourth Circuit further noted that in Lugar, the Supreme Court recog-
nized its earlier holding in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.21 3 that a pri-
vate party's joint participation with a state official in a conspiracy to
discriminate would constitute state action.21 4 Finally, the Fourth Cir-
cuit stated: "[A]s in Adickes, even in the absence of any state statute,
custom or policy which authorizes the private party's conduct; joint
activity, alone, is sufficient [for a finding of state action]. '"215 In sup-
port of this interpretation, the court referred to the following state-
ment by the Lugar Court:
It was with respect to this [conspiracy] count, which did not allege
any unconstitutional statute or custom, that the Court [in Adickes]
held that joint action of the private party and the police officer was
sufficient to support a § 1983 suit against that party .... [T]he
joint action count of Adickes did not involve a state law, whether
"plainly unconstitutional" or not.2 16
Lending further support to this view of the joint action test, the
dissent in Tarkanian declared that "private parties could be found to
be state actors, if they were 'jointly engaged with state officials in the
208. Id.
209. Id. at 430.
210. Id. at 429. Under Maryland law, the bondsman "was 'subrogated to the rights and
means possessed by the State' to apprehend [the fugitive] and subject him to trial, and 'to the
extent necessary to accomplish this .. . [to] restrain him of his liberty.' " Id. (citations
omitted).
211. Id.
212. Id. (emphasis added).
213. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
214. Id. at 152.
215. Pantazes, 810 F.2d at 429.
216. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 932, 932 n.15 (1982), quoted in Pantazes, 810
F.2d at 429 n.3.
[Vol. 44:197
NCAA AND STATE ACTION
challenged action.' "217 In doing so, the dissent ignored the Lugar
framework altogether and did not inquire whether the first prong of
Lugar had been met.
Thus, if the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the application of
the Lugar framework is followed, then it is clear that Lugar's applica-
tion will not change the outcome of the state action inquiry because
Lugar imposes no additional requirement for finding state action.
That being the case, it appears that the Lugar framework adds very
little to the analysis of state action issues; it merely "suggests [another
path] into, if not through, the thicket ' 21 8 of state action analysis. In
fact, the Lugar framework may do more than simply fail to add any-
thing useful to the state action inquiry; it is possible that the Lugar
framework will add further confusion to this already chaotic area of
law if courts continue to interpret and apply the test in an inconsistent
manner. Given this potential for further confusion in the analysis of
state action issues, the Supreme Court should seize a future opportu-
nity to announce clearly whether the Lugar framework should be uni-
formly applied in the consideration of state action issues, and if so,
whether satisfaction of the traditional state action tests will simultane-
ously satisfy both prongs of Lugar.
V. CONCLUSION
In Tarkanian, the United States Supreme Court for the first time
tackled the issue of the status of the NCAA as either a private or a
state actor. The Court held that the NCAA did not engage in state
action when it requested that the UNLV "show cause" why addi-
tional penalties should not be imposed against it if the UNLV failed to
discipline Coach Tarkanian by removing him completely from the
university's intercollegiate athletic program during the probation
period.21 9 In so holding, the Court rejected several legitimate argu-
ments demonstrating that the NCAA did engage in state action. This
result reinforces the Court's recent formalistic approach to state
action issues22° and will certainly strengthen the existing trend in the
lower courts toward finding that the NCAA is not a state actor and
hence is not subject to the strictures of the fourteenth amendment.
Unfortunately, this finding also enables the NCAA to continue to
commit "indirect" violations of constitutional rights.
217. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454, 466 (1988) (quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S.
24, 27-28 (1980))..
218. Cobb, supra note 197, at 537.
219. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. at 465.
220. See supra notes 131-86 and accompanying text.
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The reasoning in Tarkanian is also problematic because the
Court did not clarify the status of the two-pronged framework
announced in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. 22' for the analysis of state
action issues. The Lugar test has been inconsistently applied in both
the lower courts and the Supreme Court.222 Thus, it remains uncer-
tain whether Lugar is indeed the definitive framework for the analysis
of state action issues. The Tarkanian Court's silence as to the proper
role of the Lugar framework in the analysis of state action issues adds
unnecessary confusion to an already muddled area of law.
JOSE R. RIGUERA
221. 457 U.S. 922 (1982); see supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
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